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Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Prognosen zum demographischen Wandel westlicher Gesellschaften gehen davon aus, dass sich
die Zahl hilfebedu¨rftiger A¨lterer in den na¨chsten Jahrzehnten verdoppelt, wa¨hrend gleichzeitig
die Zahl Angeho¨riger und ehrenamtlicher Personen, die diese Personen pflegen und unterstu¨tzen
ko¨nnen, zuru¨ckgeht. Einige Vorhersagen gehen daher davon aus, dass fu¨r die Aufrechterhaltung
des gegenwa¨rtigen Versorgungsniveaus der Pflegeversicherung eine Verdreifachung der Beitragssa¨tze
notwendig sein wird. In Anbetracht dieser Umsta¨nde hat der Gesetzgeber im Jahr 2002 in einer
Erweiterung des Pflegegesetzes die Mo¨glichkeit geschaffen, neue Modelle und Versorgungsformen
in der Pflege zu pru¨fen. Ein wichtiges Programm ist dabei das personengebundene Pflegebudget.
Das Pflegebudget bietet die Leistungsho¨he der Sachleistung den Pflegebedu¨rftigen in Form eines
Budgets, das flexibel fu¨r pflegenahe Leistungen und Gu¨ter eingesetzt werden kann. Casemanager
sollen zudem auf individueller beratend und unterstu¨tzend die Verwendung des Budgets begleiten.
Das personengebundene Pflegebudget wurde in einem sozialen Experiment in den Jahren 2004
bis 2008 an sieben Standorten getestet. Durch Randomisierung der Teilnehmer in eine Maßnah-
megruppe von Budgetbeziehern und eine Kontrollgruppe mit Bezug von Regelleistungen ko¨nnen
Unterschiede im Versorgungsniveau kausal dem Pflegebudget zugeordnet werden. Das bestehende
System erlaubt zum einen den Bezug von Sachleistungen, die entsprechend einem Katalog von au-
torisierten Pflegediensten mit Versorgungsvertrag erbracht werden ko¨nnen. Zum anderen ko¨nnen
Pflegebedu¨rftige das sog. Pflegegeld wa¨hlen, das in seinem Einsatz unbeschra¨nkt ist, aber in der
Leistungsho¨he etwa der Ha¨lfte der Sachleistungen entspricht. Je nach der zuvor bezogenen Ver-
sorgungsart erwarten wir daher unterschiedliche Effekte. Im Vergleich zur Sachleistung kann der
Bezug des Pflegebudgets zu einer Verbesserung der Versorgung fu¨hren, wenn Leistungen flexibler
und besser abgestimmt bezogen werden. Gegenu¨ber dem Pflegegeld ist dieser Effekt nicht zu er-
warten, da hier bereits eine flexible Versorgungsform zur Verfu¨gung steht. Vielmehr ist davon
auszugehen, dass Pflegehaushalte bisher informell geleistete Pflege nun durch gewerbliche Leis-
tungserbringer substituieren.
Die Evaluation der Effekte des Pflegebudgets im Hinblick auf die Versorgungssituation besta¨tigen
diese Erwartungen empirisch. Wa¨hrend der Bezug des Pflegebudgets zu einer Leistungsausdehnung
(gemessen an der Zahl der Pflegestunden) im Vergleich zu den Sachleistungen fu¨hrt, bleibt der
Umfang im Vergleich zum Pflegegeld unvera¨ndert. Hier substituieren Pflegehaushalte informell
erbrachte Pflegeleistungen mit Leistungen privater, gewerblicher Anbieter.
Non-technical summary
During the next decades, western societies at a varying speed face a demographic transition that
more than doubles the number of elderly individuals in need of long-term care and that at the
same time decreases the number of informal caregivers. As a consequence, public responsibility for
the provision of long-term care will continue to grow. In the German context, the demographic
transition fuels doubts about the fiscal sustainability of the Long-Term Care Insurance (LTCI).
According to several forecasts, contribution rates to LTCI would have to triple in the next decades
to maintain the current level of support. Since institutionalized care tends to be costly, one way
of mitigating the impact of the demographic transition on public expenditures is to strengthen the
provision of home care.
The legislator therefore passed an amendment of the LTCI law in 2002 as the legal basis for testing
a professionally assisted consumer directed home care program, Personal Budgets, as an alternative
to the provision of agency-directed home care. Agency care is restricted to a legally approved and
limited catalogue of care services that are provided by authorized agencies only. Personal budgets
correspond to the monetary value of agency care, but extend the use of these funds beyond the
restrictive catalogue to any care-related services. Due to the extended coverage and the additional
assistance of a care manager, personal budgets are likely to produce better care outcomes compared
to agency care. However, in case of supplementing the LTCI home care scheme by personal budgets,
personal budgets would also compete with cash payments, an unassisted consumer-directed home
care program of the LTCI that grants only half the monetary value of personal budgets, but can
be spent for any desired services or goods. Cash recipients whose care needs are mainly met by
informal care may now choose the more generous personal budget in order to substitute informal
by formal care.
Personal budgets were tested in a long-run social experiment that was carried out in seven German
counties between 2004 and 2008. Based on the random assignment of participants into a treatment
group of personal budget recipients and a control group of standard home care recipients, this paper
evaluates the impact of personal budgets on the extent of support by four different types of formal
and informal caregivers. The results show that personal budgets increase the amount of care for
former recipients of agency care. For former recipients of cash payments the overall time spent
on care remains unchanged due to a crowding out of informal by formal care. Since we observe a
relevant share of cash recipients who switch to personal budgets without any traceable impact on
care outcomes, the crowding out induced by the consumer-directed personal budget seems to exceed
those of agency-directed home care.
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Abstract
This paper evaluates the effects of a professionally assisted consumer-directed program (Per-
sonal Budgets) compared to the standard home care programs of the German long-term care
insurance. The evaluation makes use of a long-run social experiment at seven different sites with
a random assignment into a treatment group receiving personal budgets and a control group in
standard home care programs, i.e. an in-kind benefit (agency care) and cash payments. Com-
pared to agency care personal budgets yield better care outcomes with regard to the overall
support of formal and informal caregivers. In contrast, personal budgets do not improve care
outcomes compared to the much less generous cash payments due to a strong crowding out of
informal by formal care.
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1 Introduction
During the next decades, western societies at a varying speed face a similar challenge: a demographic
transition that more than doubles the number of elderly individuals in need of long-term care and
that at the same time decreases the number of informal caregivers. As a consequence, public
responsibility for the provision of long-term care will continue to grow (see OECD, 2006). Since
institutionalized care tends to be costly, current public long-term care programs try to strengthen
home care. In particular, much of the debate evolves around the possible advantages of consumer-
directed programs compared to the provision of agency care. While in the latter case individuals
with care needs receive prescribed services from a publicly authorized agency, consumer-directed
programs enable care recipients to act as employers of care assistants and to gain greater control
and choice over how to meet their care needs (Stone, 2001).
In the German context, the demographic transition fuels doubts about the fiscal sustainability
of its mandatory and non-means tested social Long-Term Care Insurance (LTCI). According to
forecasts of Kronberger Kreis (2005), Ha¨cker and Raffelhu¨schen (2004) and Herzog Commission
(2003), original contribution rates to LTCI of 1.7 percent of gross salary would have to triple in the
next decades to maintain, ceteris paribus, the current level of support. The LTCI grants benefits
for home and nursing home care conditional only on a minimum level of care needs. With the
dual purpose of sustaining independent living of older persons and mitigating the impact of the
demographic transition on public expenditures for long-term care, the legislator therefore passed an
amendment of the LTCI law in 2002 as the legal basis for testing a professionally assisted consumer
directed program in a social experiment: Personal Budgets.
In the current system, beneficiaries who opt for home care choose between three programs: an
unassisted consumer-directed cash payment, agency care twice the monetary value of the cash
option, and a combination of both. Agency care is restricted to a legally approved and limited
catalogue of care services that are provided by authorized agencies only. Cash payments, on the
other hand, can be spent for any desired services or goods and the program strongly encourages
the hiring of relatives and friends. Therefore, all those whose care needs can be met by informal
care without any public support have a strong incentive to take advantage of the cash option of the
LTCI. Personal budgets, in contrast, are supposed to improve the accommodation of care needs for
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those who - mainly due to a lack of informal caregivers - opt for agency care in the current LTCI
system. Thus, personal budgets correspond to the monetary value of agency care, but extend the use
of these funds beyond the restrictive catalogue. Moreover, services need no longer be provided by
care agencies authorized by the LTCI, but may also be provided by independent and often cheaper
caregivers. Due to the extended coverage and the additional assistance of a care manager, personal
budgets are likely to produce better care outcomes compared to agency care. At the same time,
however, personal budgets may induce a crowding out: Individuals who due to sufficient informal
support to meet their care demands would have opted for the less generous cash benefits before
may now choose the more generous and compared to agency care less restrictive personal budget
in order to substitute informal by formal care (Grabowski, 2006). From an LTCI perspective, this
fuels concerns that personal budgets increase overall spending while care outcomes remain rather
unchanged for former recipients of cash benefits.
This paper evaluates the impact of personal budgets compared to alternative home care programs
based on a social experiment that was carried out in seven German counties between 2004 and
2008 with a random assignment into a treatment group of personal budget recipients and a control
group of standard home care recipients. In health policy, program evaluations, especially those
based on social experiments, are still in its infancy. A rare exception is the program evaluation
of the Cash and Counseling Demonstrations, a comparable social experiment in the context of
long-term care programs (Foster, Brown, Phillips, Schore, and Carlson, 2003). Our evaluation
thus provides valuable insights in how economic incentives affect the behaviour of households that
are struck by the frailty of one of its members. Based on the Personal Budget Demonstrations, the
contribution of the paper is twofold. First of all, the paper presents novel evidence on care outcomes
of consumer-directed compared to agency-directed care in the German context and thus contributes
to the international debate on consumer-directed programs. Secondly, we also examine the relevance
of a crowding out for those who currently receive a less generous cash option of the LTCI home
care program. To the best of our knowledge, we thus provide the first assessment of whether a
consumer-directed compared to an agency-directed home care program crowds out informal care.
For the evaluation of care outcomes, we estimate the effect of personal budgets on the extent of
support by four different types of formal and informal caregivers compared to both agency-directed
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care and cash payments. In spite of randomization, we observe some differences between treatment
and control group in the outcomes of interest before program start. In addition, we have to deal
with some non-random panel attrition. Hence, we apply a difference-in-differences estimator and
take account of the non-random nature of panel attrition. The results show that personal budgets
increase the amount of care for former recipients of agency care whereas the overall time spent on
care remains unchanged for former recipients of cash payments due to a crowding out of informal
by formal care. Since we observe a relevant share of cash recipients who switch to personal budgets
and for whom LTCI spending doubles without having a traceable impact on care outcomes, we find
evidence that the consumer-directed personal budget crowds out informal care to agency care.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides some institutional background for the German
LTCI and information on different international home care programs. Section 3 presents an outline
of the social experiment and discusses selected descriptives of the participants. The evaluation
strategy is provided in section 4. Section 5 presents the empirical estimates. In the final section,
we discuss our findings in light of both a German and an international policy perspective.
2 Personal budgets as a complement to current LTCI benefits
In Germany, individuals are eligible for LTCI benefits if the Medical Review Board approves one of
three levels of disability. Eligible individuals in need of care can then choose between three types
of home care programs and nursing home care. In the case of home care, the beneficiary can either
receive cash benefits or in-kind benefits, so called agency care, twice the monetary value of the cash
benefit. In addition, if the monthly claim for agency care is not exhausted, the remaining percentage
can be granted as a cash benefit if an informal caregiver takes over the remaining nursing needs.
This results in the combination of both types of grants, i.e. mixed benefits, as a third type of home
care program.1 The existing system of home care provision thus already allows for a high level of
flexibility as the client can choose between the extremes of receiving agency care with a minimum
of autonomy and the receipt of pure cash payments with a maximum of autonomy as well as a
continuum of combinations between these two extremes. In 2006, around a third of beneficiaries
1As an example, a client in home care who is granted the second level of disability can either receive 410 Euro in
cash, 921 Euro in-kind as agency care or any combination between these two. A fifty percent receipt of agency care
worth 460 Euro are then complemented by fifty percent of cash benefits, i.e. 205 Euro.
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received nursing home care, while almost 50% opted for cash payments, 9% received pure agency
care and 10% received a combination of both cash payments and agency care (German Federal
Ministry of Health, 2007).
Table 1: Comparison of Personal Budgets with Standard Benefits of LTCIa
agency care cash payments personal budget
benefit level (in %
of agency care)
100% 44.5-53.5%b 100% + overhead for care
management
coverage of services
and goods
only services from approved
catalogue provided by autho-
rized agencies
none any care-related services and
goods; no payment of first-
degree relatives
monitoring yes, by agency services’
provider
no, but semiannual health
checks
yes, by care manager
requirement of
benefit exhaustion
no, excess funds are paid as
cash payments (combination
benefits)
no yes, excess funds have to be
refunded
care management no no yes
a Combination benefits are a mixture of agency care and cash payments depending on the share of agency care spent.
b Level of payments varies according to the level of dependency assigned to the person in need of care.
Table 1 shows that the reform option tested in the demonstration differs from the current home
care programs in a number of respects. Compared to agency care that covers only the restrictive
list of approved services and have to be provided by an agency that is authorized by the LTCI2,
personal budgets expand the coverage to any type of care-related services and allow for the hiring
of independent workers. Moreover, a mandatory care management is supposed to help clients
to implement a care arrangement that best suits their needs. Former evaluations of consumer-
directed programs in the US and the Netherlands as well as evaluations of the cash option in the
Austrian and German long-term care insurance suggest that clients who self-direct their home care
arrangement gain control and express a higher level of satisfaction than agency-directed clients
(Benjamin, Matthias, and Franke, 2000 and Foster, Brown, Phillips, Schore, and Carlson, 2003,
Miltenburg and Ramakers, 1999). Furthermore, concerns regarding a lower quality of care provision
in the case of consumer-directed programs could not be confirmed (Badelt, Holzmann-Jenkins,
Matul, and O¨sterle, 1997, Nemeth and Pochobradsky, 2004, and Schneekloth and Mu¨ller, 2000,
Foster, Brown, Phillips, Schore, and Carlson, 2003). Moreover, there is evidence that consumer-
directed care increases total service hours because due to a missing overhead and lower fringe
benefits the hiring of independent workers is less costly than the hiring of agency workers (Benjamin,
Matthias, and Franke, 2000). For an international review of consumer-directed programs see Kodner
2These agencies have to fulfill certain criteria concerning the organization and quality of care.
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(2003), Wiener, Tilly, and Cuellar (2003), Tilly and Wiener (2001), and Lundsgaard (2005). In light
of this international literature, the consumer-directed personal budget may thus yield better care
outcomes per Euro spent by the German LTCI than agency care.3
Predictions regarding the effects of personal budgets compared to the cash option of the LTCI are
more difficult, as there are differences not only in coverage, assistance, and monitoring, but also in
the level of granted benefits. Concerning the benefit level, personal budgets grant the monetary
value of agency care as a cash payment to the client, and thus correspond to twice the benefit level
of the existing cash option. As a disadvantage, however, services and goods covered by personal
budgets are restricted compared to the cash option. While cash benefits can be considered as an
income supplement that can be used for any goods and services, personal budgets necessitate the use
of the funds for care-related goods and services and also preclude the hiring of first-degree relatives,
i.e. spouses and children. Moreover, the compliance with these regulations is monitored by a care
manager who assists the client in organizing an adequate care plan and monitors the adequacy of
care provision. Despite these restrictions, the monetary advantage of personal budgets compared
to cash payments and the extended coverage compared to agency care are likely to make personal
budgets an attractive alternative for at least some share of cash recipients. For them, personal
budgets are likely to foster the purchase of services provided by independent care providers, but it
is unclear to what extent the additional financial resources are used to increase total service hours
or to simply reduce the burden of informal caregivers.
According to the literature, individuals with sufficient informal support to meet their care demands
are likely to participate in home care programs in order to substitute informal by formal care
(Grabowski, 2006). Indeed, empirical studies confirm a substitution effect between informal and
formal care (Greene, 1983; Hanley, Wiener, and Harris, 1991; Ettner, 1994, Pezzin, Kemper, and
Rechovsky, 1996). Moreover, home care programs often have little or no retarding effect on the
probability of entering a nursing home (Christianson, 1988; Wooldridge and Schore, 1988). One
likely reason for this finding is that these programs reduce nursing home use only among certain
sub-groups (Greene, Lovely, and Ondrich, 1993), while most recipients of public home care would
not have entered a nursing home for a substantial time period irrespective of the receipt of publicly
3We cannot in general evaluate the cost efficiency of personal budgets as we lack information on the administrative
cost as well as on the costs of the care management.
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financed services (Weissert, Cready, and Pawelak, 1988). Hence, the empirical literature indicates
that publicly provided formal home care may crowd out informal care which results in increasing
public long-term care expenditure while total care provided remains constant. Such crowding out
effects could even be stronger for the less restrictive consumer-directed as compared to agency-
directed home care (Grabowski, 2006) because the latter is less of a substitute for privately funded
home care. If this was the case, we should observe a relevant share of cash recipients that opt for
personal budgets and at the same time observe a strong substitution between informal by formal
care. In fact, the need to refund any cash that has not been spent for care-related services at the end
of the month (see Table 1) may especially encourage individuals to substitute informal by formal
care.
Depending on the benchmark home care program, personal budgets thus correspond to very different
treatments and should be examined separately. Irrespective of the benchmark, however, personal
budgets are likely to alter care arrangements with regard to the amount of support by different types
of caregivers. We thus examine the extent of support measured in terms of hours of care provided by
week for four types of caregivers: (i) relatives and (ii) friends and volunteers as informal caregivers,
and (iii) agency workers working for agencies that are authorized by the LTCI and (iv) independent
workers who provide services without being contracted by the LTCI as formal caregivers. For lack
of a better measure of the achieved level of health and care, we additionally examine the total hours
of care provided by all caregivers as a proxy of the attained care level. Similar to van Houtven and
Norton (2008), we thus assume one hour of care to be comparably effective for all types of carers.4
For previous recipients of agency care, we expect a partial substitution of agency by independent
care providers so that total hours of care provided per week may increase. For former cash recipients,
independent workers are likely to substitute for informal support and the expected effect on total
hours of care is unclear.
4If the quality of care provided per hour differs across providers, one would like to estimate effects in terms of
standardized care hours. Since there is no information in the data to define an adequate weighting scheme, we have
to stick to this assumption.
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3 Personal Budget Demonstrations
Conducted as a social experiment with a random assignment of all program participants into treat-
ment and control group, the Personal Budgets Demonstrations provide the means to empirically
examine the effect of personal budgets on the extent of support of formal and informal caregivers
compared to the currently available home care grants. Personal Budgets took place in seven Ger-
man counties between 2004 and 2008.5 Sites were chosen to include both rural and urban regions
as well as regions in eastern and western Germany, but cannot be considered to be representative
for Germany as a whole. Still, the counties cover a wide range of regions, from the rural and
unemployment-struck Annaberg in eastern Germany to urban and prospering regions in western
Germany.6 This mixture of sites at least ensures that Personal Budgets is implemented under quite
different regional conditions in terms of both the supply of and the demand for care services.
The control group continued to receive agency care, cash payments, or a combination of both, while
the treatment group received the personal budget with additional support from a care manager.
The minimum requirement for being eligible to participate was to be eligible for LTCI benefits. In
addition, at five of the sites, access to Personal Budgets was granted only to home care recipients
with a share of agency care of at least 50%. At only two sites, all individuals irrespective of
the current choice of benefit were eligible for participation because the initial focus of Personal
Budgets was on the comparison of agency-directed and consumer-directed care. Before assigning
participants to either the treatment or control group, a base interview was conducted by local care
managers. The purpose of this base interview was to collect information concerning the demographic
and socioeconomic background of the elderly person and his/her household as well as the current
organization of care. In addition, information was collected on the care recipient’s abilities to
accomplish basic activities of daily life such as dressing, preparation of food, housekeeping, being
mobile, shopping etc. In cases in which the care recipient was not able to answer the survey on his
own, the main caregiver, mostly a close relative, was asked to answer the questionnaire instead.7
5Personal Budgets was launched on behalf of the association of compulsory health insurers (Verband der deutschen
Angestelltenkassen, VdAK). It was carried out under the supervision of the polytechnical university in Freiburg (Evan-
gelische Fachhochschule Freiburg, EFH) and accompanying research was accomplished by the Centre for European
Economic Research (ZEW Mannheim) and a sociological research institute in Freiburg (FIFAS, Freiburg).
6It should be noted that one site (Munich) could not be used for evaluation. The control group design was
abandoned at this site because the local target group of individuals who leave hospitalization had proven to be very
reluctant to participate in a random assignment. The following analysis thus leaves out these participants.
7Around 30 % of the interviews could be conducted with the care recipient only. In 50% of the cases, the interview
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Semiannual follow-up interviews with the care recipients were conducted by the care managers
in case of the treatment group and by additional interviewers in case of the control group. The
contents of the follow-up interviews correspond to the base interview excluding all questions on
time-invariant background characteristics.
Table 2: Number of Treatment and Control Group Interviews by Former
Benefit Receipta
Former benefit receipt Treatment group Control group
base fup6 fup12 fup18 base fup6 fup12 fup18
Agency care 122 99 79 59 39 25 17 10
Cash payment 94 73 56 45 66 43 22 13
Mixed benefits 58 44 32 18 25 14 8 4
Initial claim 36 28 18 10 19 12 4 3
Total 310 244 185 132 149 94 51 30
a fupx = follow up interview after x months.
Table 2 contains the number of available treatment and control group interviews by the type of
former benefit receipt which deserves a number of remarks: First, for those who claimed LTCI
benefits for the first time or previously received mixed benefits, we do not know the treatment as
it may be an unknown mixture of two heterogenous treatments. We therefore restrict our analysis
to those previously receiving agency care or cash payments. Second, there are more than 300 base
interviews in the treatment group and only 150 in the control group. This excessive assignment
into the treatment group is due to the fact that - for political reasons - random assignment had
been suspended during the early in-take period. If care managers took advantage of this suspension
period by actively promoting the project among those they considered the most needy, this may
have introduced a selection into the treatment group that needs to be accounted for in the evaluation
design. Third, the share of participants with a follow-up interview after one year is around 40% for
the treatment group, but less than 30% in the control group. This above-average panel attrition
on the part of the control group may be due to a lack of motivation as they do not directly benefit
from participating in Personal Budgets. If attrition is non-random and related to care outcomes,
our evaluation strategy will have to take account of panel attrition. Moreover, due to decreasing
numbers of observations, we restrict the evaluation to the treatment effects within one year of
program participation. Finally, despite the intake of former cash recipients being restricted to two
was conducted with both the care recipient and the main caregiver, while 20% of the interviews were pure proxy
interviews with the main caregiver.
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sites, we have a relevant number of former cash recipients in our sample. An important condition for
personal budgets to crowd out informal care compared to agency care is fulfilled: personal budgets
are attractive to at least some share of former cash recipients. In fact, in the two counties where
program eligibility was not restricted to recipients of agency care, the share of home care recipients
who participated in the demonstration was 5.5% among recipients of agency care, 3.5% among
mixed benefit recipients and 3.4% among cash benefit recipients. Among those who contacted the
local care management office for further information on Personal Budgets, 40% of all agency care
recipients, 44% of all mixed benefit recipients, and 32% of all cash benefit recipients decided to
participate in the program. On the one hand, these figures suggest that personal budgets are not
equally attractive to all home care recipients. On the other hand, the participation rates imply
that the share of former cash recipients opting for program participation in order to receive the
personal budget is not negligible and only somewhat lower than the participation rate for recipients
of agency care.
Sample descriptives can be found in Table B.1 in the Appendix. If random assignment to the
treatment group had been successful, sample characteristics at the time of the base interview should
be comparable for treaties and controls. At least for some characteristics - e.g., the county of
residence, age, pre-treatment care arrangement - we do find some imbalances between both sub-
groups though. Moreover, even if the sample was perfectly balanced at first, panel attrition may
result in a non-comparable treatment and control group in the course of time. The next section
further examines the relevance of possible sample selection issues based on multivariate analyses
and develops an adequate evaluation strategy in order to identify the effect of personal budgets on
the support of different groups of caregivers.
4 Estimation Strategy
The standard framework in microeconomic evaluation of treatment effects is the potential outcome
approach dating back to Roy (1951) and Rubin (1974) with two potential outcomes Y 1 (individual
receives treatment) and Y 0 (individual does not receive treatment). The observed outcome for any
individual i can be written as: Yi = Y 1i ·Di+(1−Di) ·Y 0i = Y 0+Di(Y 1−Y 0), where D ∈ {0, 1} is a
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binary treatment indicator. The treatment effect for each individual i is the difference between the
potential outcomes ∆i = Y 1i −Y 0i . Since one of the outcomes is unobservable for each individual, we
have to concentrate on population averages of gains from treatment instead of calculating individual
effects directly. In particular the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) for those who
actually participate in the program is given by
∆ATT = E(∆ | D = 1) = E(Y 1 | D = 1)− E(Y 0 | D = 1). (1)
The problem in estimating this treatment effect is that the second term in eq. 1 is unobservable. In
experimental data, treatment D is randomized across eligible persons so that the potential outcomes
Y 0 and Y 1 are statistically independent of the treatment indicator. It follows that E(Y 0 | D = 1) =
E(Y 0 | D = 0) holds and we can use the nonparticipants to adequately estimate the counterfactual
outcome. Thus, social experiments have been considered as the ideal way to evaluate the impacts
of programs.8
However, problems in the implementation of Personal Budgets may give rise to biases.9 First of all,
randomization into treatment and control group may be incomplete due to suspending the random
assignment at the beginning of the project. The differences between treatment and control group
in the descriptive statistics in Table B.1 already point towards a possible selection of individuals
into treatment. In order to further examine the reliability of randomization, we estimate a binary
probit model of the probability of assignment to the treatment group. We include regressors that,
on the one hand, may affect the assignment process and that, on the other hand, may influence
care outcomes. Apart from basic socio-demographic characteristics such as age, gender and marital
status and information on household size and number of children, we take account of individual
care needs, i.e. the level of dependency that is granted by the LTCI as well as a care needs index
that reflects an individual’s care needs based on the self-assessed need to receive help with relevant
activities of daily life. We further include care outcomes before program start such as the number
of care hours provided by informal and formal caregivers. In addition, we control for the regional
context by including dummies for the six program sites. Table 3 provides separate estimates for
former recipients of cash payments and agency care.
8See Orr (1999) and Smith (2000) for a comprehensive discussion of social experiments.
9See Bijwaard and Ridder (2005) and Heckman and Smith (1995) for a discussion of possible sources for biases.
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Table 3: Probit Estimates on Randomization
Agency Care
Recipients
Cash Recipients
Coeff. Coeff.
Demographics
age -0.0605 0.0069
age2 0.0006 -0.0001
female -0.2910 0.1750
married 0.7367** -0.4930
Number of children (in reference to one child)
none -0.7227* -0.0490
two or more -0.6288 0.0295
further person in household 0.2528 -0.2226
Program site (in reference to Annaberg)
Erfurt -1.2158** 0.4437
Kassel -0.9623 –
Marburg -1.5084** –
Neuwied -0.9634 –
Unna -0.7274 –
Need of care (in reference to LTCI-grade 1)
health index -0.0040 0.0117
LTCI-grade 2 -0.0032 -0.6595**
LTCI-grade 3 -0.0024 -0.0194
Care arrangement
hours of informal care per week 0.0027 0.0046*
hours of formal care per week 0.0081 0.0076
help from relatives -0.0852 -0.1860
help from friends and volunteers -0.1218 0.5462**
help from authorized agencies 0.1473 -0.4485
help from independent workers -0.2085 -0.2012
Constant 3.4462 -0.5936
Statistics
pseudo R2 0.1628 0.1316
N 161 160
Stars denote significance on 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***) level.
If participation in the treatment group was completely random, none of the covariates should have
a significant effect. However, program sites significantly affect the probability of being in the
treatment group for former agency care recipients. Moreover, some socio-demographic variables as
well as the care needs affect the assignment into the treatment group. For characteristics that affect
both the selection into the treatment group and the outcome of interest, this implies a selection
on observables that can be taken care of by including relevant characteristics as covariates in the
outcome equation. However, Table 3 indicates that for former recipients of cash benefits, pre-
program care arrangements significantly affect the probability of being treated despite controlling
for observable individual and household characteristics. This suggests a selection on unobservables
that violates the identifying assumption of the social experiment.
We remedy this problem by applying a difference-in-differences approach (DiD, see e.g. Ashenfelter
and Card, 1985) that controls for pre-program differences in outcomes for the treatment and the
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control group. The crucial assumption for the validity of the DiD-estimates is that in the absence of
treatment, the average outcomes for the treated and controls would have followed parallel paths over
time (Abadie, 2005). In case pre-treatment characteristics that are associated with the dynamics of
the outcome are unbalanced between treatment and control group, this assumption may be violated.
In our case, this would mean that the differences in the extent of hours in the care arrangement
prior to participation are due a individual-transitory shock. A possible example for such a shock is
the anticipation of the individuals of being assigned to the treatment group. If persons expect to be
assigned to the treatment group, they may change their care arrangement in advance which would
result in the observed differences. Unfortunately, we have no information on earlier time periods to
test the existence of such a shock. We thus have to assume that such transitory shocks do not exist
and bias our estimates.
The corresponding DiD-estimator for outcome yit can be written as
yit = β0 + β1treat+ δ0t2 + δ1t3 + δ2treat× tx=2,3 + δ3treat× t3 + x′iβ + ci + uit, (2)
where treat is a dummy variable capturing differences between treatment and control group before
program start at t1. t2 and t3 are dummy variables for the follow-up interviews six and twelve month
after program start. These dummies take account of aggregate factors affecting y in the absence of
the program. δ2 is the parameter estimate of the treatment effect, defined as the interaction of t2
and treat. δ3 allows this treatment effect to differ with an increasing duration of the program. xi
is a matrix of additional covariates such as program site or socio-demographic characteristics that
may be relevant for both the selection into treatment and the outcome of interest. These covariates
refer to the time-constant pre-program characteristics. In addition, we allow for an unobservable
individual effect ci. How to estimate eq. 2 consistently and efficiently depends on the assumptions
that we are willing to make with regard to the relationship between ci and the observable covariates,
especially the treatment indicator.
If ci is uncorrelated to the observed explanatory variables included in eq. 2, pooled OLS with
standard errors that are robust to individual clustering may yield consistent estimates for the linear
outcomes of care hours per week. If, in addition, the idiosyncratic error term is not only uncorrelated
to the contemporaneous explanatory variables, but to observable covariates in each time period, we
may apply a random effects panel estimator to potentially gain efficiency. However, ci may be related
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to the treatment indicator. In particular, ci might capture financial resources of the household or
the willingness of relatives and friends to support the elderly person. If these omitted characteristics
affect both the selection into the treatment group as well as care outcomes, estimation by a pooled
or random effects panel estimator yield biased results. In order to allow for an arbitrary correlation
between the unobserved individual effect and observable covariates, a fixed effects estimator may
be applied. Due to demeaning, however, the time-constant xi cannot be identified in this model.
An additional challenge to consistently estimate the parameters of interest is panel attrition. In
the case of fixed effects estimation, sample selection due to panel attrition is only a problem if the
selection process is related to the idiosyncratic error term uit. Whether this is the case can be tested
by including a lagged indicator of attrition in the fixed effects estimation. The extended fixed effects
estimations of eq. 2 suggest, however, that sample selection is fully absorbed by ci. Fixed effects
estimations thus need not be corrected for sample selection in our case. Any estimator that assumes
ci to be uncorrelated to the observable covariates, however, will be biased if panel attrition is non-
random and not fully captured by the observables in eq. 2. To take account of panel attrition in the
pooled and random effects estimation, one possibility is to use the two-step procedure suggested by
Heckman (1979). In the standard set-up, the first stage consists of estimating a selection equation
and computing an omitted variable bias correction term. Let Zit be a binary indicator denoting
participation in each group in period t = 2, 3:
Zit = 1(wit′αi + vit > 0). (3)
(Zit,wit) are always observed. Moreover, assume v ∼ N(0, 1) and (u, v) to be independent of w
with zero mean, and E(u|v) = γv. Without loss of generality, we assume V ar(v) = 1 since Zit is a
dummy variable. Then, we can estimate eq. 3 by a binary probit model for each time period t = 2, 3
P (Zit = 1|wit) = Φ
(
wit′αi
)
. (4)
We estimate this selection equation separately for the treatment and control group in order to
allow for different attrition processes. Based on eq. 4, we calculate the inverse Mills ratios as
λˆit = λit (wit′αˆi) = φ (wit′αˆi) /Φ (wit′αˆi). We stack the λˆit of the two groups into one vector λˆt.
In a second stage, we then augment eq. 2 to
yit = β0+β1treat+ δ0t2+ δ1t3+ δ2treat× tx=2,3+ δ3treat× t3+x′iβ+ γ0λˆt2 + γ1λˆt3 + ci+uit, (5)
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which can be estimated on the unbalanced sample by pooled OLS or a random effects panel esti-
mator.
For identification, estimation of eq. 5 necessitates exclusion restrictions that influence the panel
attrition but not the outcomes, i.e. xit in eq. 5 has to be a subset of wit in eq. 3. Hence, changes
in the care context of the participant (e.g. a shock to the available informal support) that likely
affect outcomes are not suitable as exclusion restrictions. Instead, we use two exclusion restrictions
capturing program conditions that may affect attrition but not care outcomes. First of all, drop
offs of interviewers may reduce the probability to participate in follow-up interviews as it may be
an obstacle to discuss intimate aspects with a new interviewer. Throughout the demonstration
about 25% of the interviewers in the control group had to be substituted by a new interviewer. In
the treatment group, however, interviews were conducted by care managers among whom attrition
occurred only once. As an additional exclusion restriction, we therefore use the gap measured in
days between the last interview and the fixed and exogenously determined end date of data collection
because we observe some variation in the availability of interviews with an increasing gap. Although
interviews are supposed to take place every six month, there seem to be delays in some cases. This
may be either due to limited availability of the participants and their proxy respondents or problems
in the coordination of the appointments of the interviews. In our case, the probability to participate
in follow-up interviews increases with an increasing gap, but at a diminishing rate. To cover such
non-linearities, we also include a quadratic of the gap in eq. 3. First stage estimates of eq. 3 can
be found in Appendix A and reveal that panel attrition is systematically related to a number of
individual and household-related characteristics. Moreover, the exclusion restrictions are highly
significant and have the expected sign.
In the subsequent analyses, we test for robustness of results by comparing pooled with random and
fixed effects panel estimators. For pooled and random effects estimates, we only show results for the
augmented outcome equation 5 that takes account of panel attrition because corresponding estimates
do not differ substantially from estimates that do not control for non-random panel attrition.10
10Estimates for equation 2 are available from the authors upon request.
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5 Results
We now present the results on the extent of support by the caregivers, i.e. the weeks hours provided.
As mentioned above, we distinguish two groups of informal caregivers, relatives and friends and
volunteers, as well as two groups of formal caregivers, authorized care agencies and independent
providers in the empirical analysis. Table 4 provides separate estimates for former recipients of
agency care and cash payments. Besides the variables of interest, we also included a number of
covariates in the estimation.11 We only display the effect of the treatment group indicator treat,
the treatment effect treat× t2,3 and the selection terms accounting for non-random panel-attrition
λ2,3. Table 4 also shows the corresponding effects on the total hours of care provided per week while
Table 5 displays the aggregate result for informal and formal caregivers.
Table 4 suggests heterogeneous effects of personal budgets depending on the type of benefit an
individual received previously. Compared to agency-directed care, personal budgets do not reduce
the support by relatives or friends and volunteers. Moreover, the effect on the hours of care pro-
vided by independent providers is large with about 11.7 (pooled estimation) to 13.2 (fixed effects
estimation) hours per week after six months and intensifies by an additional 7.3 (random effects
estimation) to about 7.9 (fixed effects estimation) hours per week after one year. Thus, the total
effect is to increase the weekly hours provided by independent workers by around 20 hours. Given
these findings, it is of little surprise that we also find at least some weakly significant evidence for
an expansion of total care hours. While total care hours after six month increase by insignificant
three to six hours depending on the estimator, there is some significant expansion of total care hours
after one year of 15 to 18 hours per week according to the pooled and random effects estimates.
Individuals who previously opted for agency care mainly due to insufficient informal support seem
to use personal budgets to partially substitute care provided by authorized agencies by independent
providers while maintaining the limited support by informal caregivers. Since independent workers
are cheaper, care recipients are now able to purchase more formal care hours. Of course, the quality
of service provision by independent providers may be worse than those provided by well-qualified
agency workers. However, care recipients still employ agency workers and only seem to shift certain
11The other variables regarded in the estimation are age, age (squared), female, married, further person living in
household, frequently contact with friends, number of children (categorial), level of care granted by LTCI (categorial),
care index and program site (categorial). Full estimates including all covariates are available from the authors upon
request.
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Table 4: Effects on care hours per week provided by different care
providers for former recipients of cash payments and agency servicesa
Agency Care Cash Payments
PO RE FE PO RE FE
Relatives
t2 2.972 4.255 5.6179 2.450 3.178 4.341
t3 2.704 6.062 8.6277 8.378 5.269 4.602
treat 5.884 4.127 11.673 11.151
treat× tx=2,3 -3.723 -4.923 -6.0459 -14.781* -16.620** -18.845**
treat× t3 8.741 6.234 4.8961 -8.540 -6.221 -5.094
λ2 47.726** 43.400 6.368 -0.835
λ3 -9.704 -10.268 3.699 4.711
N 161 161 161 160 160 160
Friends and volunteers
t2 -0.686 -0.609 -0.196 -0.425 -0.349 -0.239
t3 -0.434 -0.172 0.617 -1.127 -1.558 -1.551
treat 0.085 0.075 10.821*** 10.474***
treat× tx=2,3 0.429 0.362 -0.019 -6.639** -5.507** -4.986
treat× t3 1.194 0.991 0.568 1.971 1.347 1.243
λ2 1.104 0.804 -5.873 -3.741
λ3 -0.535 -0.442 1.840 0.675
N 161 161 161 160 160 160
Authorized care agencies
t2 1.682 1.813 1.893 -0.129 -0.157 -0.166
t3 -0.028 0.780 1.275 0.229 0.111 0.081
treat 1.821 1.938 -0.486 -0.601
treat× tx=2,3 -2.154 -2.731 -3.473** 0.569 0.608 0.614
treat× t3 0.784 -0.057 -0.605 -0.080 -0.033 -0.020
λ2 -5.171 -4.437 -0.614 -0.8232
λ3 1.111 0.877 0.628 0.5737
N 161 161 161 160 160 160
Independent providers
t2 -4.143 -4.752 -5.993 1.861 0.880 1.078
t3 -2.971 -4.444 -6.431 1.915 1.533 2.751
treat 0.916 0.752 2.002 1.317 1.782
treat× tx=2,3 11.730** 12.210*** 13.216** 7.733 8.152* 8.818*
treat× t3 7.362** 7.855* 8.276 2.473 2.346 0.487
λ2 -4.185 -5.085 16.370 13.620*
λ3 2.727 2.422 -5.168 -4.595
N 161 161 161 160 160 160
Total of care hours
t2 -0.174 0.284 1.321 3.739 3.599 4.209
t3 -0.728 1.415 4.089 9.408 5.125 4.234
treat 8.706 7.131 23.737*** 22.035**
treat× tx=2,3 6.283 5.232 3.679 -12.301 -13.000* -14.187*
treat× t3 18.080*** 15.362* 13.136 -5.101 -3.193 -2.301
λ2 39.474** 34.822 16.470 7.139
λ3 -6.401 -7.308 0.783 1.461
N 161 161 161 160 160 160
Stars denote significance on 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***) level.
a Estimations include age, age (squared), female, married, further person living in
household, frequently contact with friends, number of children (categorial), level of
care granted by LTCI (categorial), care index and program site (categorial) as addi-
tional covariates.
PO = pooled sample (cross-section estimation), RE = random effects panel model,
FE = fixed effects panel model. See text for details.
tasks to independent providers. Thus, if one is willing to assume that independent providers fulfill
these care tasks with a similar level of quality as agency workers, personal budgets tend to allow for
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an expansion of support at identical cost (abstracting from the costs for the caremanagers). This
indicates efficiency gains of personal budgets compared to agency care.
Table 5: Effects on care hours per week provided by different
care providers for former recipients of cash payments and agency
servicesa
Agency Care Cash Payments
PO RE FE PO RE FE
Informal caregivers
t2 2.286 3.642 5.421 2.025 2.895 4.102
t3 2.270 5.906 9.245 7.251 3.591 3.051
treat 5.969 4.304 22.493** 21.618**
treat× tx=2,3 -3.294 -4.564 -6.064 -21.419** -22.497*** -23.831***
treat× t3 9.934* 7.205 5.464 -6.569 -4.683 -3.851
λ2 48.830** 44.218* 0.495 -5.481
λ3 -10.240 -10.605 5.540 5.631
N 161 161 161 160 160 160
Formal caregivers
t2 -2.460 -3.149 -4.100 1.732 0.733 0.107
t3 -2.999 -4.026 -5.156 2.144 1.657 1.183
treat 2.737 2.654 1.516 0.735
treat× tx=2,3 9.576** 9.596** 9.743** 8.303* 8.755* 8.877**
treat× t3 8.145** 7.851* 7.672 2.393 2.309 2.434
λ2 -9.356 -9.774 15.757 12.839
λ3 3.839 3.203 -4.540 -4.017
N 161 161 161 160 160 160
Stars denote significance on 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***) level.
a Estimations include age, age (squared), female, married, further person living in
household, frequently contact with friends, number of children (categorial), level
of care granted by LTCI (categorial), care index, and program site (categorial) as
additional covariates.
PO = pooled sample (cross-section estimation), RE = random effects panel model,
FE = fixed effects panel model. See text for details.
With regard to former cash recipients, the picture clearly differs. We now find a significant and
strong reduction of support by relatives with about 14.8 (pooled estimation) to 18.9 (fixed effects
estimation) less hours of support per week. This strong finding may reflect two institutional features
of the personal budget compared to the cash option: the interdiction of remunerating close relatives
and the extension of the benefit level as a means of increasingly purchasing formal care. The second
feature is more likely to drive the observed changes in the care arrangement because the amount
of hours spent by friends and volunteers whose payment is not restricted by the personal budget is
strongly reduced as well. Table 5 thus indicates that service hours provided by informal caregivers
decrease by more than 20 hours, while support by formal caregivers increases by around 8 hours per
week. This latter finding is driven by extended support by independent providers as shown in Table
4. Adding these opposing effects together, there is some evidence that total care hours per week
decrease for former recipients of cash payments (but the statistical significance of the estimates is
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weak). This need not imply reduced level of care provision though if the quality of care provided
per hour by an independent providers exceeds the quality of informal care. Nevertheless, the results
clearly indicate a strong substitution of informal care by formal care for former cash recipients.
Since all these individuals previously did not switch to the more generous agency care, but did so
only for the less restrictive consumer-directed personal budget, we argue that personal budgets lead
to a crowding out of informal care compared to agency care.
6 Conclusion
Based on the Personal Budget Demonstrations long-run social experiment at seven German sites,
this paper has evaluated the impact of personal budgets on care outcomes compared to the two main
home care programs currently available from the LTCI, agency care and cash benefits. Despite the
experimental design, we have applied a difference-in-differences estimators in order to take account
of possible self-selection and correct our estimates for non-random panel attrition.
For former recipients of agency care, our findings indicate that the support by agency workers
is partially substituted by less costly independent workers, while support by informal caregivers
remains unchanged. The evidence is also indicative for rising total hours of care provided per week.
If we assume a comparable care quality of agency and independent workers, this finding therefore
suggests that personal budgets may be a means to improve care outcomes per Euro of benefits that
is granted by the LTCI. Our results thus confirm the favourable findings of similar international
evaluations of consumer-directed compared to agency-directed programs. While this is a highly
desirable outcome from the perspective of the LTCI, the implementation of personal budgets as an
additional home care program also hinges on the effects personal budgets exert on former recipients
of the less generous cash benefit. The corresponding results indicate a relevant shift of cash recipients
to the personal budget for whom a strong substitution of informal care by formal care increases
LTCI spending without increasing the total hours of care provided per week. In the context of the
German long-term care system that offers agency care as well as a less generous cash benefits to its
home care beneficiaries, the transition to an extended LTCI scheme that includes personal budgets
tends to crowd out informal care to a non-negligible extent. This is because personal budgets are
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less restrictive in use than agency care and are therefore a closer substitute for privately funded
home care that directly compete with the informal provision of care.
Despite the German specifics, we think that our findings are also relevant for international scholars
and policy advisors. In particular, we would like to argue that in a system with a public provi-
sion of either agency-directed or consumer-directed care, the moral hazard of participating in such
public programs despite having sufficient informal care should be stronger for consumer-directed
as compared to agency-directed care. This is what Grabowski (2006) named the woodwork effect
that is the equivalent to the crowding out of informal care among former cash recipients in the
German context. Since we are not aware of any attempts to assess - depending on the specifics of
the country’s long term care provision - the additional crowding out or moral hazard that is induced
by consumer-directed compared to agency-directed care, we therefore encourage scholars from other
countries to provide further evidence on this issue.
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A Appendix
The inverse Mills ratio terms included in the estimation of the treatment effects are computed
based on separate first stage estimates on panel attrition for treatment and control group and for
the different types of benefits received before program. The results are, however, comparable to
Table A.1: Probit Estimates on Panel Attrition before the first and
the second follow-up interview
Drop off before first
follow-up
Drop off before second
follow-up
Controls Treated Controls Treated
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Exclusion Restrictions
gap in days 0.4851*** 0.1535*** 0.4283*** 0.3790***
gap2 -0.3146*** -0.0856** -0.2404*** -0.2090***
interv. left program -1.4061*** 0.5879 -1.0779*** 0.1931
Sociodemographics and household context
age -0.1188* -0.0607 0.0479 -0.0402
age2 0.0010* 0.0004 -0.0005 0.0003
female -0.2900 0.1677 -0.4169 0.4623**
married -0.1815 0.2946 -0.2158 0.1665
additional household member 0.7248 0.1110 0.5257 -0.0847
regular contact to friends 0.7034** 0.1107 0.5087* 0.3622**
Number of children (in reference to one child)
none -0.7844 -0.0493 0.8391 0.2862
two or more -0.3215 -0.0949 0.7292 0.1308
Level of care granted by LTCI (in reference to grade 1)
LTCI-grade 2 -0.4650 0.3547 0.4831 0.1952
LTCI-grade 3 -0.5684 0.1766 0.7024 0.0069
care needs index (0-100) 0.0236** -0.0177*** 0.0041 -0.0101*
Type of benefits before program (in reference to initial claim)
agency care 1.4147** 0.0926 0.7854 0.3616
cash payments 1.5442*** -0.3329 1.0446* -0.2241
mixed benefits 0.3568 -0.1023 0.6408 -0.1057
Program site (in reference to Annaberg and Kassel)
Erfurt -3.2585*** 0.4962 -0.4093 0.0864
Marburg -1.8933** 0.5132* 0.7053 0.5212*
Neuwied -2.5367*** 0.6098** -0.2602 0.6609**
Unna -2.3399** 0.6009* 0.2143 0.2479
Constant -0.8023 1.5433 -8.1328*** -3.3132**
Statistics
pseudo R2 0.3605 0.1153 0.3196 0.2472
N 149 310 149 310
Stars denote significance on 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***) level.
the corresponding estimates for the full sample which we therefore display in Table A.1 instead.
We estimate separate models of panel attrition between waves 1 and 2 and waves 1 and 3. The
results show that the exclusion restrictions are able to capture panel attrition. With an increasing
gap between the date of the first interview and the date of data transfer the probability of being
observed in the panel increases in both groups as well as for both intervals (waves 1 and 2, 1 and
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3). The change of the care manager or interviewer between two interviews affects the probability
negatively in the control group only; for the treatment group no significant difference could be
established. In addition, age, social relationships (further person in the household, close friend
available, having a child) affect the panel survival probability.
B Tables
Table B.1: Selected Descriptives and t-Tests of Equality or χ2-Tests of Independence
(means, wave 1)
Full Sample Cash Payments Agency Care
Treaties Controls p-value Treaties Controls p-value Treaties Controls p-value
Sociodemographics
age (years) 74.5 71.9 0.10 73.0 72.3 0.84 74.1 69.2 0.04
female 0.64 0.67 0.95 0.70 0.64 0.39 0.64 0.69 0.54
married 0.29 0.31 0.59 0.29 0.41 0.12 0.28 0.13 0.03
Number of Children
none 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.38
one 0.23 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.25 0.08
two and more 0.55 0.60 0.20 0.60 0.59 0.98 0.50 0.54 0.05
Need of care
care needs indexa(1-100) 66.2 63.9 0.29 66.1 61.0 0.13 63.7 60.5 0.39
LTCI-level 1 0.55 0.54 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.64
LTCI-level 2 0.32 0.36 0.28 0.38 0.30 0.26
LTCI-level 3 0.13 0.09 0.42 0.14 0.04 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.81
Care arrangement
total care hours/week 64.5 55.2 0.09 86.4 62.5 0.02 41.1 31.1 0.15
informal care hours/week 51.0 41.7 0.11 73.8 53.6 0.06 27.1 18.7 0.19
formal care hours/week 13.6 13.5 0.97 12.6 8.9 0.45 14.0 12.4 0.72
help from relatives 0.76 0.79 0.52 0.81 0.85 0.51 0.70 0.62 0.30
help from friends/volunteers 0.33 0.25 0.07 0.41 0.23 0.01 0.25 0.33 0.33
help from agency workers 0.62 0.54 0.09 0.16 0.26 0.13 0.88 0.87 0.93
help from independent worker 0.38 0.40 0.65 0.36 0.42 0.42 0.34 0.36 0.88
Program site
Annaberg 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.03
Erfurt 0.15 0.19 0.23 0.20 0.17 0.31
Kassel 0.13 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.21
Marburg 0.15 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.31
Neuwied 0.37 0.48 0.73 0.80 0.13 0.10
Unna 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.16 0.05 0.07
Type of benefits before program
initial claim 0.12 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
agency care 0.39 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
cash payments 0.30 0.44 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
mixed benefits 0.19 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
observations 310 149 94 66 122 39
a The care index is based on the self-assessed ability to accomplish activities of daily life. The index is constructed
to be 100 in case of full dependence on care and support by others.
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